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GIBSON GUITAR CORP. V. PAUL REED SMITH
GUITARS, LP

423 F.3D 539 (6TH CIR. 2005)
I. INTRODUCTION

In Gibson Guitar Corp. v. PaulReed Smith Guitars,LP, Gibson
Guitar Corp. ("Gibson") filed suit in federal district court in
Nashville, Tennessee alleging that Paul Reed Smith ("PRS")
infringed on Gibson's Les Paul guitar trademark.' Gibson alleged
that the PRS "Singlecut" guitar design infringed on Gibson's Les
Paul registered design, and thereby created a likelihood of
confusion.2 On cross motion for summary judgment, the district
court found no genuine issue of material fact for trial, and granted
Gibson's partial summary judgment motion.3 Further, the district
court issued a permanent injunction that prevented PRS from
"manufacturing, selling, or distributing its Singlecut line guitars."4
The case went before the Sixth Circuit on an interlocutory
appeal of the injunction granted by the district court.5 The Sixth
Circuit disagreed with the district court's interpretation of the
Gibson trademark, and the district court's finding of a likelihood
of confusion.6 The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court's
1. Gibson Guitar Corp. v. Paul Reed Smith Guitars, LP, 423 F.3d 539, 544
(6th Cir. 2005).
2. Id. at 543.
3. Id.

4. Id.
5. Id. at 542.
6. Id.at 546, 553.
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decision to grant summary judgment in favor of Gibson, and
vacated the permanent injunction.7
II. BACKGROUND

For over one hundred years, Gibson was in the business of
manufacturing musical instruments, including high-quality
guitars.8 PRS began manufacturing guitars in the mid-1970s, and,
in 1985, opened its first factory. 9

Gibson introduced the first Les Paul guitar in 1952. ° Since that
time, several more models under the Les Paul name were
developed, including the "solid-body, single-cutaway electric
guitar."" The single cutaway guitar had a traditional guitar shape,
with a portion removed from the area where the lower section of
the fingerboard met the body of the guitar. 12 This area formed the
"horn" which allowed a musician to access higher strings and
positions. 3
Gibson first applied for registration of the Les Paul trademark on
July 29, 1987."4 The United States Patent and Trademark Office
issued the registration on July 20, 1993.1' On September 27, 1999,
the mark became 'incontestable' within the meaning of 15 U.S.C.
6
§§ 1065 and ll15(b)."'
PRS first offered the single-cutaway guitar for sale in January
2000.17 At a trade show in February 2000, PRS displayed several
models of the "Singlecut," a solid-body, single-cutaway electric
guitar. 8 The PRS Singlecut contained "the PRS headstock, logo,
fretboard inlay, three-dimensional 'scoop' carve in the cutaway
7. Gibson GuitarCorp., 423 F.3d at 553.
8. Id. at 543.

9. Id.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 544n.3.
Gibson GuitarCorp., 423 F.3d at 544 n.3.
Id. at 544.
Id.
Id.
Id.

18. Id.
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which indicates manufacture by PRS, and hanging tags attached to
the guitar at shipment and used at point of sale."' 9
On March 27, 2000, Gibson sent PRS a letter that demanded
PRS cease and desist from the production and sale of the
Singlecut. 2° Gibson sued PRS on November 6, 2000 in federal
district court in Nashville, Tennessee, when it received no
response to its letter. 2' Gibson alleged trademark infringement,
counterfeiting, false designation of origin, and dilution under the
Lanham Act.2 2 It also brought claims of unfair competition, fraud,
and deceptive business practices under state law. 3
PRS
counterclaimed and asserted that Gibson's trademark was invalid
and, therefore, unenforceable; that the Gibson trademark was not
infringed; that any trade dress associated with the Les Paul guitar
was not protectable; and that the Singlecut did not infringe any
such trade dress.24
PRS filed a motion for summary judgment on all its claims and
counterclaims. 25
In response, Gibson moved for summary
judgment on its trademark infringement claim.2 ' The district court
granted Gibson's motion for summary judgment and denied PRS's
motion in its entirety. 7
Following the court's order, the parties jointly requested to: "(1)
amend Gibson's complaint to state only the trademarkinfringement claim; (2) amend PRS's answer to state only
trademark-related counterclaims; and (3) dismiss all other claims
and counterclaims with prejudice." 28 The district court granted the
parties' request and Gibson filed an amended complaint to which

19. Gibson Guitar Corp., 423 F.3d at 544 n.4 (quoting the Joint Appendix to
PRS Reply to Gibson Response to PRS Statement of Undisputed Facts).
20. Id. at 544.
21. Id.
22. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114(1), 1125(a), 1125(c) (2000)
23. Gibson Guitar Corp., 423 F.3d at 544.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Gibson Guitar Corp. v. Paul Reed Smith Guitars, LP, 311 F. Supp. 2d
690, 725 (M.D. Tenn. 2004)
28. Gibson Guitar Corp., 423 F.3d at 544.
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PRS filed an answer.2 9 On July 2, 2004, the district court
addressed several matters raised in PRS's trial brief and a motion
in limine filed by Gibson. The court issued an order which
contained a permanent injunction against PRS.3 ° PRS filed an
interlocutory appeal of the district court's issuance of the
3
permanent injunction. '
The parties agreed that Gibson had a registered trademark on its
Les Paul guitar design; and the mark clearly included the twodimensional guitar shape that was submitted in the registration
papers.3 2 The issues on appeal were whether the mark extended to
"three-dimensional objects where two dimensions of those objects
have the same general shape (but not the same exact proportions)
as the drawing in the registration papers," and whether the mark
covered "additional product features shown in a photograph
accompanying the registration papers."33 Essentially, the issue in
dispute was whether trademark protection covered product shape
and features.34

29. Id.
30. Id. at 545; The Order reads as follows:
This is hereby ORDERED that the Defendant Paul Reed
Smith, its partners, employees, agents and all persons in active
consent with them are ENJOINED from manufacturing,
selling, or distributing, or in any manner [ ] enabling or aiding
others to manufacture, or to sell, or to distribute the PRS
Singlecut guitar and all versions thereof, including but not
limited to their exterior shapes and features, the designs of
which have been determined to violate Plaintiff's rights to
protection under the Lanham Act for its incontestable
trademark registration, No. 1,782, 606 for Les Paul guitar.

Id.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Id.
Id. at 542.
Id.
Gibson Guitar Corp., 423 F.3d at 542 n.1.
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III. Legal Analysis

A. Proprietyof GrantingInjunctive Relief
The Sixth Circuit noted that the grant of a permanent injunction,
when reviewed by an appellate court, must be reviewed for clear
error with regard to factual findings, de novo with regard to legal
conclusions, and abuse of discretion with regard to the scope of
injunctive relief.35
The court explained that, typically, an
evidentiary hearing must be held prior to issuing an injunction.36
The court determined that it was unclear from the parties'
submissions whether such a hearing was held.3 7 If no hearing was
held, the grant of an injunction would have been improper.38 The
court noted, however, that an injunction may nonetheless be
upheld if an evidentiary hearing is not necessary because "no
factual issues remain for trial."39 If no factual issues remain for
trial, then summary judgment should be granted.4 ° Therefore, the
court found that the question of the propriety of the permanent
injunction was dependent upon whether the district court properly
granted summary judgment to Gibson."
B. The Scope of the Les Paul Trademark
The Sixth Circuit began its review of the district court's grant of
summary judgment by analyzing the Les Paul trademark.4 2 In its
review, the court stated that the district court had misinterpreted a
fundamental issue.43 Specifically, the court found that the district
court confused trademark law with trade-dress law when it
35. Id. at 546.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. (citing Moltan Co. v. Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc., 55 F.3d 1171, 1174
(6th Cir. 1995)).
40. Gibson Guitar Corp., 423 F.3d at 546.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
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concluded that the Les Paul trademark protected the entire guitar
as opposed to simply the two-dimensional drawing submitted for
registration. 44 The court found that the two-dimensional silhouette
included in the registration for the Les Paul trademark should not
have been construed to include other aspects such as the style of
the knobs, switches, etc., and their location on the guitar, because
doing so incorrectly created a trademark on the whole guitar.45
The court found that the district court's incorrect analysis
stemmed from an overly broad reading of In re ECCS, Inc.46
Specifically, the Sixth Circuit found that reliance on ECCS
allowed the district court to justify its expansion of Gibson's
trademark on the guitar shape to include other design features of
the instrument, which would normally be considered trade dress.47
The court disagreed with the expansion of Gibson's trademark,
stating that trademark law and trade dress law are two separate
forms of protection under the Lanham Act.4"
The court
emphasized that the only claim at issue was Gibson's trademarkinfringement claim."
C. TrademarkInfringement Under the Lanham Act
The Sixth Circuit began its review of the trademark
infringement claim by declaring that the standard for trademark
infringement under the Lanham Act was whether a likelihood of
confusion existed. In order to prevail, Gibson needed to establish
that PRS's Singlecut guitar was likely to cause confusion among

44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Gibson Guitar Corp., 423 F.3d at 547. The issue in In re ECCS was
whether a trademark applicant should be permitted to modify an erroneous
drawing to conform to its trademark, rather than change the trademark to
conform to its erroneous drawing. The court held that it was proper to look at

the specimens submitted with the application, rather than an inconsistent,
erroneous drawing to determine what the applicant wished to register. In re
ECCS, Inc., 94 F.3d 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
47. Gibson Guitar Corp., 423 F.3d at 547.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 548.
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customers in regard to its origin. 5' The court determined confusion
based on eight factors: "(1) strength of the plaintiff's mark, (2)
relatedness of the goods or services, (3) similarity of the marks, (4)
evidence of actual confusion, (5) marketing channels used, (6)
likely degree of purchaser care, (7) the defendant's intent in
selecting its mark, and (8) likelihood of expansion of the product
lines. 5 2 The district court resolved all the factors in favor of
Gibson, except for factor four: "evidence of actual confusion."53
Because there was no evidence of point-of-sale confusion, factor
four would have favored PRS.54 However, on the fourth factor, the
court went on to reason that, "given the striking similarity of the
PRS Singlecut to Gibson's Les Paul and the instant market
recognition of Gibson's Les Paul... initial confusion would occur
in the marketplace between parties' products as to the 'Singlecut'
guitar's source."55 The district court, therefore, held that the fourth
factor nonetheless favored Gibson. 6 The appellate court took
issue with this holding, finding that there "was no theory of
confusion upon which Gibson could prevail."57
1. Gibson's Theories ofPurchaserConfusion
Gibson argued that while there may have been no evidence of
actual confusion at point-of-sale, there existed initial-interest
confusion, post-sale confusion, or some combination of the two.58
The Sixth Circuit disagreed and found that neither form of
confusion, nor any combination of the two, existed in the case. 9

51. Id.
52. Id. (quoting Jet, Inc. v. Sewage Aeration Sys., 165 F.3d 419, 422 (6th
Cir. 1999) (citing Frisch's Rests., Inc. v. Elby's Big Boy of Steubenville, Inc.,
670 F.2d 642, 648 (6th Cir. 1982)).
53. Gibson Guitar Corp., 423 F.3d at 548.
54. Id.
55. Id.

56. Id.
57. Id. at 549.
58. Id.
59. Gibson Guitar Corp., 423 F.3d at 549.
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a. Initial-InterestConfusion
The court stated that initial-interest confusion occurs when "a
manufacturer improperly uses a trademark to create initial
customer interest in a product, even if the customer realizes, prior
to purchase, that the product was not actually manufactured by the
trademark-holder."6
The court noted that PACCAR Inc. v.
TeleScan Techs., L.L. C., a case where initial-interest confusion
analysis was applied, involved very different facts: PACCAR
involved Internet domain names. Further, the three cases that were
cited in support of initial-interest confusion were also Internet
cases." The court determined that the application of initial-interest
confusion outside the Internet context was an issue of first
impression in the Sixth Circuit.6 2 Further, the court noted that
"[a]lthough other circuits have applied the initial-interest
confusion doctrine to find trademark infringement based on use of
a deliberately deceptive name or logo ... [the Sixth Circuit] [was]
not aware of any circuit that [had] applied the initial-interest
confusion doctrine to a trademark on a product's shape."63
The court explained that the potential ramifications of extending
the doctrine to apply to product shape were different than if the
doctrine was applied to product logo or name.64 To clarify, the
court explained that there are only a specific number of shapes into
which products can be made.65 While a product may have a shape
that allows it to be trademarked (i.e. not functional or generic), it
may still look similar to a competing product when viewed from
the end of a store aisle.66 Therefore, the court found that if the
initial-interest doctrine were to be applied to product shapes, it
would allow trademark holders to not only protect the shape of
their particular product, but also many variations of somewhat
similar shapes that would not otherwise be protected.67
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

Id. at 549.
Gibson GuitarCorp., 423 F.3d at 550-51.
Id.
Id. at 551 n.15.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Gibson Guitar Corp., 423 F.3d at 551.
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The application of initial-interest doctrine was especially
important in the summary judgment context, because if initialinterest confusion were allowed to stand as one of the eight
"likelihood of confusion factors," it would be substantially easier
for product-shape trademark holders to survive summary judgment
motions than for any other plaintiff alleging another form of
trademark infringement.68 Therefore, the Sixth Circuit held that,
given the anti-competitive effects of extending the initial-interest
confusion doctrine to product shape infringement, the initialinterest confusion doctrine should not be applied in such a
manner.6 9 It is of note, however, that the court emphasized that it
did "not go so far as to hold that there is never a circumstance in
which it would be appropriate to apply the initial-interest
confusion doctrine to a product-shape trademark."7 °
b. Post-Sale Confusion
The court then examined post-sale confusion, which occurs
when use of a trademark leads individuals (other than the
purchaser) mistakenly to believe that a lower quality product was
manufactured by the trademark-holder."' The court distinguished
the one published case where it had applied post-sale confusion.72
The court clarified that concern in a post-sale confusion case is
whether the marketing of a defendant's clearly inferior replicas
could damage the reputation of a plaintiff in the field.73 The court
held that the post-sale confusion doctrine was not applicable in this
case because Gibson had conceded that PRS's guitars were not
clearly inferior.74

68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. (emphasis in original)

71. Id.at 552.
72. Gibson GuitarCorp., 423 F.3d at 552; See Esercizio v. Roberts, 944 F.2d
1235, 1245 (6th Cir. 1991).

73. Gibson Guitar Corp., 423 F.3d at 552.
74. Id.
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c. Gibson's Smoky-Bar Theory of Confusion
Gibson argued that the two theories of confusion (initial-interest
confusion and post-sale confusion) should be taken together to
75
form what the court termed, a "smoky-bar theory of confusion.
Gibson suggested that the confusion did not lead a consumer to
purchase a PRS guitar instead of a Gibson, but rather that the
confusion occurred when a musician was playing a PRS guitar and
potential purchasers saw it and believed it to be a Gibson. 76 The
Sixth Circuit stated that because PRS guitars are concededly highquality guitars, the court did not believe such an occurrence would
harm Gibson.77 Furthermore, the court noted, if a potential
purchaser saw a PRS and believed it to be a Gibson, and then went
out and bought a Gibson, plaintiff would not harmed, but rather
helped, by this confusion. 8
2. The Summary Judgment Motion
The Sixth Circuit determined that neither initial-interest
confusion, post-sale confusion, nor Gibson's smoky-bar theory of
confusion existed to support Gibson's claim of trademark
infringement. 9 Therefore, the court ruled there was no basis for
Gibson's trademark infringement claim."0 Accordingly, the district
court's ruling was reversed, and the case was remanded to the
district court with instructions that summary judgment be granted
in favor of PRS, rather than Gibson."'
IV. CONCLUSION

The Sixth Circuit held that Gibson's trademark-infringement
claim was unsupported, and therefore reversed the district court's

75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Id.
Id. at 552-553.
Id. at 553.
Id.
Gibson GuitarCorp., 423 F.3d at 553.

80. Id.
81. Id.
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Having
grant of summary judgment in Gibson's favor.82
determined that the district court's grant of summary judgment to
Gibson was incorrect, the Sixth Circuit vacated the permanent
injunction issued by the district court; reversed the district court's
summary judgment ruling; and remanded the case to the district
court with instructions that summary judgment be granted in
PRS's favor.83

82. Id.
83. Id.
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